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Abstract 
This paper estimates the effect of legal status acquisition motives on intermarriage decisions. 
The analysis exploits the situation of the Spanish asylum system, since it is saturated and failing to 
process the substantial inflow of the asylum claims. The limitations of the system raise concerns about 
whether the asylum applicants are seeking alternative ways to acquire their legal status in Spain, as 
marrying Spanish citizens, or Spanish residents. The number of asylum applications reflects the 
number of asylum seekers with legal status acquisition motives. We find that the number of submitted 
asylum applications has a positive and statistically significant impact on the number of registered 
intermarriages in Spain over the period 2008-2016. We estimate that for every 100 additional 
submitted applications, the number of intermarriages increases by 3.6%, on the provincial level. Thus, 
we show that intermarriages are driven by the legal status acquisition motives of the asylum seekers. 
The estimated impact is higher when we consider intermarriages with specifically foreign female 
partners relative to those with foreign males. Our baseline results hold across several robustness 
checks and a placebo test. 
JEL Classification codes: H19, J12, J60. 
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1.   Introduction 
Most countries in the European Union (EU) have been dealing with a significant number of asylum 
seekers. According to the Spanish Refugee Aid Commission (CAER in Spanish), in 2017, more than 
700,000 people left their home countries, searching for safety in Europe.1 Asylum seekers or 
international protection applicants are individuals who escape their countries as a result of political 
conflicts, wars, violence, abuse, poverty, or human rights violations and apply for protection in others. 
After their accepted applications are processed, they can be granted international protection and thus, 
legal status in the host country, or they can be rejected and expected to leave. 
Spain ranks the sixth EU member in the number of asylum applications received. This number 
has been increasing substantially over the years, reaching 55,750 claims in 2018 after it was 5,483 in 
2014 (Eurostat, 2018).2 However, the Spanish asylum system has been failing to adapt to this 
increasing trend, where it has been witnessing delays in the processing of the asylum applications. 
While the Spanish law states that the processing period and hence, the final decision on the claims 
must take a maximum of six months, it has been taking more than one year, on average (AIDA, 
2018).3   Only 22% of the accepted asylum applicants received a final decision in 2018. The 
unprocessed, pending cases have been accumulating year after year, reaching 68,779 by the end of 
2018 after they were 16,000 in 2015 (Eurostat, 2018). This situation has resulted in the saturation of 
the Spanish asylum system. Besides, the limitations of the system are not only restricted to the delay in 
the processing period, and thus, the accumulation of the pending cases. The rate of rejection on the 
processed asylum applications has been increasing too. 
The failure of the asylum system in fulfilling its role effectively may incentivize the asylum 
seekers to search for alternative ways to acquire the legal status and start their new lives in Spain. This 
can be mainly attributed to the idea that the waiting period for the final decision could last for more 
than one year. During the waiting process, as they are recognized to be international protection 
applicants without legal status, asylum seekers face employment restrictions that prevent them from 
finding decent job opportunities. Hence, their lives in Spain are placed on hold until their applications 
are handled, and they are granted international protection.   
An adequate alternative could be either marrying a Spanish citizen, or a Spanish resident (EU or 
a non-EU national) who has been living in Spain for at least two years.4 This type of intermarriage will 
grant the refugees the immediate right to live and work in the country. With the Spanish residency, 
they will have the privilege of benefiting from social services (education, healthcare, and housing) and 
social security. For asylum seekers, intermarriage can be the key to legal status acquisition hence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The CAER is an NGO in Spain, founded in 1979. It aims to defend the migrants, the refugees, or stateless individuals.  
2 Yearly statistics on the decisions of the asylum applications in Spain are available at Eurostat (online code: migr_asydcfsta). 
3 Information and statistics on asylum in Spain is reported by the Asylum Information Database (AIDA) (available at 
https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/spain/). 
4 In Spain, marriages are legally registered, when at least one of the spouses is a citizen or has been legally residing in Spain for at least two 
years (more information on Spanish marriages is available at /www.mjusticia.gob.es). 
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socioeconomic integration.  
Our paper aims to study how legal status acquisition motives of the asylum seekers affect 
intermarriage decisions. We exploit the institutional setting of the Spanish asylum system to analyze 
this impact. Specifically, we estimate how the variation in asylum applications affects the number of 
intermarriages in Spain. The number of asylum applications reflects the number of refugees with the 
desire to obtain legal status in Spain. Given the limitations of the asylum system and its adverse 
consequences on the lives of the asylum seekers, we expect that there is a positive relationship 
between the number of submitted asylum applications and the number of intermarriages in Spain.  
The existence of such an effect is a relevant issue for the policymakers. Intermarriage improves 
refugees’ social and economic status, thus their living conditions. With the legal status acquisition, 
they benefit from the unrestricted access to the labor market and employment services. They become 
self-sufficient and contribute to public finances through income taxes. They can successfully integrate 
into society and the economy. Nonetheless, this type of intermarriage can be associated with social 
and psychological problems. It creates distortions in the marriage market since the spouses are 
overcoming the cultural differences between them and uniting for personal motives. Also, in those 
marriages, the asylum seekers most probably live under the despair and control of their spouses. Their 
legal status is directly linked to their partners, so they cannot risk losing them and accordingly, their 
right to live in Spain. Given this vulnerability and dependency, the refugees might also be subject to 
different types of abuses and domestic violence from their spouses, like behavioral control, emotional 
abuse (insult, criticism, or degradation), verbal abuse, or physical and sexual abuse (Amuedo-Durantes 
and Arenas- Arroyo, 2019). 
This area of study is considerably neglected in the literature. While, there exist several papers 
which study the impact of legal status on labor market outcomes (as Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2007; 
Lozano and Sorenson, 2011; Devillanova et al., 2017; Monras et al., 2018) and on criminal behavior 
(as Freedman et al., 2018; Mastrobuoni and Pinotti, 2015; Fasani, 2018) there are only two studies 
(Azzolini and Guetto, 2017; Adda et al., 2019) analyzing the effect of legal status acquisition on 
marriages. They estimate the impact of the EU citizenship acquisition of Italian immigrants on 
intermarriages in Italy. To our best knowledge, our paper is the first to study how the incentives to 
acquire the legal status affect intermarriage decisions while focusing particularly on the legal status 
motives of the asylum seekers. 
For our analysis, we use data on asylum applications published by the Ministry of Interior. It 
provides information on the number of applications submitted, by each country of origin to the 52 
Spanish provinces, over the period 2008-2016. We also obtain administrative data on all the marriages 
registered in Spain from the National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica in Spanish, 
INE), which covers the number of all the marriages, registered in each province over the period 2008-
2016. It also provides information on the country of nationality of the female and male spouses. Our 
sample is restricted to include only the intermarriages that might be driven by the legal status motives 
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of the asylum seekers. So, we exclude all those involving couples in which both spouses have a 
nationality from an EU country. Asylum seekers are generally non-EU nationals; they can marry 
Spanish citizens or Spanish residents (EU and non-EU nationals) to obtain their legal status in Spain. 
Besides, EU citizens have the right to live and work in Spain. Thus, our sample considers only the 
marriages in which at least one of the partners is not an EU national. It is worth mentioning that non-
EU citizens are referred to as foreigners in this paper. 
We estimate, based on the Poisson model, how the variation in the number of asylum 
applications submitted by the different countries of origin to the 52 Spanish provinces over the period 
2008-2016 affect the number of intermarriages registered in each of these provinces. Hence, the study 
is performed on the province level. First, we estimate that 100 additional asylum applications increase 
the number of intermarriages by 3.6 %. Then, we further focus our analysis and show that 100 
additional asylum applications increase the number of intermarriages in which specifically the male 
partners are foreigners by approximately 3%. The number of intermarriages in which the female 
partners are foreigners increases by 3.9%, for every 100 additional asylum applications. Our baseline 
results suggest that the legal status acquisition motives of the asylum seekers, translated through their 
asylum applications, has a positive and significant effect on intermarriages. The estimated effect is 
higher when considering specifically intermarriages with foreign female partners relative to those with 
foreign male partners. This suggests that foreign females tend to be more involved in intermarriages 
than foreign males.  
We also conduct several robustness checks to examine the strength of our baseline results. First, 
we show that the effect on the number of intermarriages registered within a given year is a result of the 
variation in the number of asylum applications within this same year and not the year before. This 
result suggests that asylum applicants react immediately and seek intermarriage to acquire legal status. 
Second, we focus our analysis on only the provinces with a high concentration of asylum applications 
and show that our results are fully robust to the alternative sample restrictions. Finally, we analyze the 
relationship between legal status motives and intermarriages at the country level rather than the 
province level and find that the effect is also positive and significant, but the magnitude of the 
estimates is not different between foreign female partners and foreign male partners. We end our 
empirical strategy with a placebo test to show that our baseline results are not due to pure chance. We 
show that our strategy is reliable, and the estimated positive significant impact on intermarriages is 
driven by the increase in the asylum applications and not other random factors.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the previous 
literature, which analyzes the impact of legal status on different behavioral outcomes. Then, in section 
3, we explain the institutional setting, focusing on the status of the asylum system and the 
intermarriages in Spain over the period of our study (2008-2016). In section 4, we describe the data 
that we used in our analysis. In section 5, we discuss our empirical strategy and the estimation results. 
Finally, our conclusion is in section 6.  
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`2.   Literature Review 
Generally, asylum seekers apply for protection when they reach the ports or airports of the host 
country. While waiting for the decision on their applications, they find themselves restricted from 
integrating into the destination country. If the asylum claims are rejected and the asylum seekers 
decide to stay in the host country, then they will be considered as undocumented or illegal immigrants. 
Existing literature has examined the consequences of the legal status acquisition of undocumented 
immigrants on several outcomes. In General, the previous studies have relied on legalization programs 
or policies in the host countries as the source of exogenous variation in the legal status of the 
immigrants. 
Most of the papers that analyze the impact of legal status on the labor market outcomes in the 
United States (US) rely on the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) that granted 
legalization and thus, legal status to illegal immigrants through two amnesty programs. The first 
program is the IRCA Legally Authorised Workers (LAW) that legalized the immigrants who arrived 
in the United States before the beginning of the year 1982. The second is the IRCA Special 
Agricultural Worker (SAW) program, which legalized farmers that worked at least 90 days within one 
year before the 1st of May 1986. The legalization occurred between the years 1989 and 1991 (Fasani, 
2015). 
Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) study the effect of legal status on wages. They examine 
whether the wages of the newly legalized immigrants in the US changed after the IRCA amnesty 
reform. For their analysis, they use data on newly authorized Mexican and Central American 
immigrant men from the Legalized Population Survey (LPS).5 They also obtain data from the 1979 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLYS79) on a sample of Latino men that entered the US 
labor market between 1979 and 1986.6 This sample serves as a comparison group, where the authors 
argue that the experience of the undocumented immigrants when they first enter the US labor market 
can be matched with the experience of other new entrants. The treatment group (LPS sample) and the 
comparison group (NLSY79 sample) are restricted to be comparable as much as possible in terms of 
different characteristics as age and cultural background. Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) perform 
separate regressions for the LPS sample and the NLSY79 sample for three different periods: when the 
unauthorized immigrants entered the labor market (1976-1985), when they were working under illegal 
conditions (1987-1988), and when they were working with legal status (1992). They find that 
legalization through IRCA is associated with a wage benefit of almost 6%.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The Legalized Population Survey (LPS) is a longitudinal survey on a sample of undocumented immigrants that were legalized by the IRCA 
amnesty programs. The first wave of the survey conducted in 1989 interviewed 6,193 randomly selected immigrants. It offers information on 
the labor market outcomes and socio-economic situation of immigrants at the time of entry to the US and amnesty application. The second 
wave of the survey offers information on two-thirds of the original sample, interviewed in 1992. 
6	  The 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLYS79) is a survey on a sample of 12,686 individuals who were 14 to 22 years old 
living in the US when they were interviewed in 1979.	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Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2007) follow the previously described study and estimate the 
differential effect of immigrant legalization on the labor market outcomes in the US. They add to the 
latter study and examine the differential impact of the IRCA amnesty reform on both the wages and 
the employment of the newly documented immigrants. They use the difference-in-differences strategy 
to compare the outcomes of the immigrants (treatment group) and the Hispanic natives (comparison 
group), before (1987) and after (1992) the amnesty reform. The authors follow the method of 
Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) and use data on newly legalized immigrants from the Legalized 
Population Survey (LPS) and the comparison group (Hispanic natives) from the 1979 National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLYS79). They portray the estimated impact separately for males and 
females. Like the previous study, the results show that legalization through IRCA has a positive 
impact on wages. Mainly, they estimate that the wage of the newly legalized immigrants has increased 
by 21% for females and 9% for males; while, the employment rate has decreased by 7 percentage 
points for females and 5 percentage points for males.  
Compared to the two previously described papers, Lozano and Sorenson (2011) use a different 
source of data to estimate the impact of IRCA amnesty programs on the earnings of illegal 
immigrants. They estimate how the wages of the Mexican immigrants changed with the acquisition of 
legal status through IRCA. They combine data from the US Census, providing information on the 
labor market outcomes of the immigrants in the US with the Mexican Migration Project  (MMP) 
survey. They use the MMP to estimate the illegal status of the Mexican immigrants, and then to 
identify the likelihood of a Mexican immigrant in the US census to be undocumented. The authors use 
the triple differences strategy and find that the earnings of the newly documented Mexican immigrants 
increased by 20 log points. So, relative to the previous papers, they also find that legal status has a 
significant positive impact on the earnings of the newly legalized immigrants. 
Barcellos (2010) and Pan (2012) use the Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) in their 
studies to estimate the impact of legal status acquired through IRCA on employment outcomes in the 
US setting. Barcellos (2010) uses data from the US Census, Current Population Survey (CPS), and the 
American Community Survey (ACS). She exploits the discontinuity occurring in the year 1982 that 
determines whether the immigrant is eligible for the IRCA reform or not. Using RDD, the author 
compares the outcomes of the immigrants who arrived a few years before 1982 with those who arrived 
a few years after. She finds that legalization increased the wages by almost 3%, but it did not affect the 
job quality and the workers’ mobility. The estimated impact on wages is positive but lower than the 
ones found in the studies portrayed before.  
Pan (2012) also uses the US census data and relies on the discontinuity occurring in 1982 as a 
result of the eligibility criteria of the IRCA amnesty program. Using RDD, the author compares 
between the male wages, females’ employment probability, and males’ English-speaking ability of 
Latino immigrants arriving in 1975-1981 with those of immigrants arriving in 1982-1986 to 
California. She finds that the 1975-1981 arrivals outperform the 1982-1986 arrivals. Legalization 
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increases the male wages by 4-5 %, female employment probability by 10-12 %, and the English 
speaking ability by 11%. The estimated impact on wages is close to the results of Kossoudji and 
Cobb-Clark (2002) and Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2007). 
The papers by Devillanova et al. (2017) and by Monras et al. (2018) also analyze the effect of 
amnesty programs on the labor market outcomes but in European countries. The previous studies 
mentioned estimate the impact of “acquiring” the legal status on the labor market outcome. However, 
Devillanova et al. (2017) aim to study how “the expectations” of becoming a legal immigrant affect 
the employment outcomes, even before the legal status is granted. They base their study on the Italian 
amnesty program that offered legalization for undocumented workers on the 9th of September 2002. 
This program provides a residence and a work permit renewable after two years only to immigrants 
who have been employed, for three months since the 11th of June 2002 (threshold day), in a job of a 
minimum one-year contract. So, the immigrants were required to enter Italy before the threshold day 
to be eligible for the amnesty program. The authors use the data set provided by Naga and estimate a 
difference-in-differences regression over the period 2000-2004.7 They compare the employment rate 
of the immigrants arriving in Italy before the threshold date to those arriving after. They show that the 
prospect of legal status significantly increased the employment rate of eligible illegal immigrants by 
26 percentage points. They also illustrate that the causal effect is persistent for some years after the 
amnesty.  
Monras et al. (2018) also examine the impact of a European legalization program on the labor 
market. Compared to the earlier papers mentioned, their study is the first to analyze the effect of 
immigrant legalization program on both the public revenue, particularly payroll-tax revenue, and on 
the labor market outcomes. The authors rely on the amnesty program applied in Spain in 2004, which 
granted work permits for almost 600,000 immigrants. They combine data on payroll taxes from the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security with data on employment from the Spanish Labor Force Survey 
and with wage data from the administrative dataset Sample of Employment Histories. They use the 
difference-in-differences strategy. They estimate the impact of the amnesty program on the payroll tax 
revenue, employment, wage of the skilled and unskilled workers (natives and immigrants), and the 
location of newly legalized immigrants over the period 2002-2007. Monras et al. (2018) find that the 
payroll-tax revenue increased by 4,289 euros for each newly legalized immigrant in each province. 
They also show that the average wages of low-skilled immigrants slightly decreased while 
significantly increased for high-skilled immigrants. The average wage of all natives increased too. 
Concerning relocations, they find that for each newly legalized immigrant, 0.07 high-skilled 
immigrant move to locations with a high level of immigrants, while 0.43 low-skilled immigrants move 
to areas with low levels of immigrants.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Naga is an Italian NGO offering health care to undocumented immigrants. It offers data on social and economic situations of the 
undocumented immigrants. 
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Most of the existing literature addresses the impact of legal status on the labor market 
outcomes; nevertheless, there exist also papers studying the effect of legal status on criminal behavior. 
Baker (2015) estimates the impact of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) on the 
number of crimes in the United States. Their analysis is performed on the county level over the period 
1980-2000. They obtain data on legalized immigrants from Legalization Summary Tapes datasets, 
provided by the US Citizenship and Immigration service, and data on crime rates from the Uniform 
Crime Reports obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for the period of study. Using 
OLS strategy, the author shows that a 1% increase in the number of legalized immigrants in a specific 
county decreases the crime by 3 % to 5%, where the effect on property crimes is higher than the effect 
on violent crimes.  
Freedman et al. (2018) also estimate the effect of IRCA on criminal behavior, but they restrict 
the analysis to only one county in Texas (Bexar County).8 They use data from the Bexar County 
District Court, on felony charges filed for the period 1985-1989. They rely on the triple differences 
strategy to compare the differences in criminal behavior before and after the legalization between 
Hispanics (treated) and non-Hispanics (control group). Contrary to the previously mentioned paper by 
Baker (2015), the authors find that the legalization did not affect criminal activity. However, the 
expiration of the first IRCA program (LAW) in May 1988 led to a significant increase in felony 
charges among Hispanics, while a decrease in charges among non-Hispanics. The expiration of the 
second IRCA (SAW) in November 1988 had no significant effect. 9 The authors suggest that the 
employment restrictions that resulted after the expiration of the program caused this significant 
increase in criminal behavior.  
Mastrobuoni and Pinotti (2015) and Fasani (2018) assess the impact of legal status on criminal 
outcomes too but in Italy. Mastrobuoni and Pinotti (2015) study the impact of the legal status 
acquisition on the immigrants’ crime rate. Relative to the earlier mentioned studies on crimes, this 
paper does not rely on an amnesty program as a source of variation in the legal status of immigrants. It 
employs the 2007 European Union (EU) enlargement that added Bulgaria and Romania to the Union, 
as the treatment. After the EU enlargement, Bulgarians and Romanians acquired the legal right to 
reside and work in Italy as other EU nationals. The authors also exploit the Collective Clemency Bill, 
which took place a few months before the enlargement and released prisoners from the Italian 
prisons.10  Hence, they analyze the impact of the legal status acquisition on the probability of 
reconviction of released immigrant prisoners. They use difference-in-differences strategy to compare 
between the reincarceration rate of immigrants from the new EU countries (treated group) and of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Bexar County is at a driving distance of approximately two hours from Mexico and has a high concentration of Hispanics. The non-
Hispanics in the 1980s living in Bexar County were unlikely immigrants. 
9 When the Legally Authorized Workers (LAW) and the Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) amnesty programs expired, the undocumented 
immigrants who failed to acquire legal status through the IRCA were significantly affected. They experienced higher employment 
restrictions and a significant drop in their wages (see Freedman et al., 2018).  
10 In July 2006, the Italian Parliament voted for Collective Clemency Bills, which was associated in the release of thousands of European 
immigrants including Romanian and Bulgarian from the prisons in Italy. The Collective Clemency Bills eliminate a certain number of years 
from the prisoners’ sentences (2 or 3 years). 
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immigrants from EU candidate countries (non-treated group) before and after the 2007 EU 
enlargement.11 The results show that legal status acquisition decreases the probability of recommitting 
a crime by 50%.  
Fasani (2018) study the effect of four different amnesty programs implemented in 1990, 1995, 
1998, and 2002 in Italy on the crime rates of non-EU immigrants. He estimates the impact of the 
number of legalized immigrants on the crime rates using Instrumental Variables (IV) strategy. The 
author uses data on immigrants’ crimes from the record of the Italian Ministry of Justice for the period 
1991- 2005. Relying on data from the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs, he determines the number of 
legalized immigrants by each amnesty in each region. The results of the paper show that legalization 
had a significant diminishing impact on crime rates in the year of the amnesty. As the number of 
legalized immigrants in a region increased, the number of immigrants with criminal charges decreased 
in that region. The estimated effect is – 0.03%, which is comparably small in magnitude to the 
previously mentioned studies on criminal behavior.  
Other than the impact on the labor market and criminal activity, existing studies argue that legal 
status may affect health outcomes (see, e.g., Baker, 2010), educational outcomes (see, e.g., Bean et al., 
2011), as well as consumption. Dustman et al. (2017) assess the effect of legal status on consumption 
behavior in Italy. They use data on immigrants’ consumption (documented and undocumented 
immigrants) over 2004-2007 from a survey performed by the Institute for Multiethnic Studies (ISMU). 
The authors rely on the Instrumental Variables (IV) strategy to estimate how exogenous variation in 
the legal status of immigrants affects consumption. The results show that illegal immigrants consume 
30% - 40 % less than legal immigrants.  
Previous studies have also analyzed the impact of the legal status acquisition on marriages. 
However, this area of study has been significantly neglected in the literature. To our best knowledge, 
there are only two papers by Azzolini and Guetto (2017) and by Adda et al. (2019) analyzing this 
issue. 
Azzolini and Guetto (2017) study the impact of the legal status acquisition on intermarriages. 
They exploit the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements as the exogenous source of variation in the legal 
status of Italian immigrants.12 The authors apply the synthetic control method to data on marriages 
acquired from the Italian Register of Marriages (IR) and analyze the impact of EU citizenship 
acquisition of Italian immigrants on intermarriages in Italy over the period 1997-2008. They consider 
only the marriages between Italian males and immigrant females. The results show that citizenship 
acquisition has a significant negative impact on intermarriages. The 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements 
were associated with a considerable decrease in intermarriage between men from Italy and foreign 
women from the new EU members. The causal impact ranges from 30 % to 80% depending on the 
countries of origin of the newly legalized female immigrants. The higher effects were on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  The EU candidate countries are Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey. 
12 In 2004, the 8 countries, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, entered the European 
Union. In 2007, Romania and Bulgaria also became EU members. As a result, the citizens of those countries acquired EU citizenship. 
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intermarriages involving immigrant women from countries that are relatively less integrated and have 
comparably less socioeconomic advantages.   
Adda et al. (2019) also rely on the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements to analyze the impact of the 
legal status acquisition in the Italian setting. They add to the previous study of Azolini and Guetto 
(2017) by estimating this impact on both: the rate of intermarriage and separation between Italian 
natives and foreigners. They obtain data on marriages and separations from ISTAT by its Laboratory 
for Elementary Data Analysis (ADELE) for the period 1998-2012. First, they rely on the difference-
in-differences strategy to estimate the causal impact of legal status. They find that after the EU 
enlargements, the probability of intermarriage between native males and immigrant females (from new 
EU member countries) and between native females and immigrant males (from the new EU countries) 
decreased by 51 % and 75% respectively. This suggests that foreign females tend to intermarry more 
than foreign males. They also show that after the EU enlargements, the separation rate between native 
males and immigrant females (from new EU countries) significantly increased by 23%. However, the 
effect is not significant for the native females and immigrant males (from new EU countries). The 
authors then develop and estimate a multidimensional equilibrium model for marriages and 
separations that accounts for marriage sorting. This approach specifies the value of legal status. They 
find that when the legal status is absent, the intermarriage probability decrease by 70% - 80%. With 
couples where one partner can grant legal status to the other, the probability of intermarriage is 
relatively higher. These results support the notion that legal status is a significant factor in 
intermarriages.  
While existing literature has examined the impact of the legal status acquisition of immigrants 
on several behavioral outcomes in different settings, to our best knowledge, our paper is the first to 
study how the incentives to acquire the legal status affect intermarriage decisions while focusing 
specifically on the legal status motives of the asylum seekers. 
Next, we proceed to describe the institutional setting of the Spanish asylum system that we 
exploit for our analysis. 
3.   Institutional Setting  
3.1.    Asylum System in Spain  
According to the Spanish Refugee Aid Commission (CAER in Spanish), asylum seekers are 
individuals who flee their countries because of danger and search for protection and safety in others. 
The reasons behind their escape are most likely related to political conflicts, wars, violence, poverty 
and hunger, gender and sexual orientation abuse, or human rights violations.  
In Spain, asylum applications are submitted to the Spanish border controls at the ports and 
airports, and within the Spanish territory at the Office of Asylum and Refuge (OAR), at any immigrant 
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center, or any police station. After the applications are accepted and admitted to the processing phase, 
the asylum seekers would be considered as international protection applicants and would be entitled to 
remain in Spain until the final decision on their asylum claims is declared (Ministry of Interior, 
2018).13 The OAR is responsible for examining the submitted asylum claims, while the Inter-
Ministerial Commission of Asylum and Refugee (CIAR in Spanish) within the Ministry of Interior 
declares the final decisions on the applications. The final decision could be granting refugee status, 
subsidiary protection, residence permit, or rejecting the applicant. Subsidiary protection is provided to 
individuals who would face serious threats, like a death penalty, execution, or torture, if they return to 
their country of origin.  
Based on Spanish law, processing the requests must take up to a maximum of six months. For 
this period, the government offers assistance fostered by different social organizations (like Accem, 
Red Cross, and CAER) to help in covering the applicants’ basic needs, accommodations, and social 
care. If the processing period took longer than six months, the applicants might be granted the right to 
work while waiting for the final decision, especially that they will no longer receive any assistance 
from the government.  
Once international protection is granted, the individuals would be entitled to reside and work in 
Spain legally. They obtain a document of identification, and those with refugee status can apply for 
Spanish nationality within only five years of stay. Protected individuals have unrestricted access to the 
labor market and employment services. Also, they are eligible for social services (housing, healthcare, 
education), social security, and integration programs (Ministry of Interior, 2018). Accordingly, they 
are entitled to achieve the same academic and career titles, like the Spanish nationals. 
3.1.1.    The Status of the Spanish Asylum System  
The total number of asylum applications, submitted to Spain, has been increasing significantly over 
the years. We use data on asylum applications from the Ministry of Interior, available for the period 
2008-2016, to examine how this number has been changing. Table 1 lists the total number of claims 
that the Spanish asylum system received for each year over 2008-2016, and Figure 1 graphs the 
evolution of this number over these years. Spain witnessed a total of 56,164 asylum claims over this 
period. The applications increased from 4,168 in 2008 to 16,481 applications in 2016. Figure 1 
portrays that the number of applications was roughly the same until the year 2014. Then, there was a 
substantial jump from 5,483 applications in 2014 to 14,560 applications in 2015.  
In 2015, the world encountered the most severe refugee crisis, where millions of refugees 
escaped their countries to seek safety (CAER, 2016). This significant flow was stimulated by the 
never-ending political armed conflicts, wars, violence, and oppression of human rights occurring in 
several countries as, Palestine, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. For instance, 5,700 Syrians applied for asylum in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Information on the process of international protection is available at http://www.interior.gob.es. 
 12 
Spain in 2015. The country also witnessed forced escapes from conflicts occurring in countries outside 
of the Middle East, as the African countries.  
Table 1: Yearly Asylum Applications submitted to Spain (2008-2016) 









2016  16,481 
Source: The numbers are based on the asylum applications data from the Ministry of Interior in 
Spain, available for the period 2008-2016. 
Figure 1: The Evolution of Asylum Applications in Spain over the Period 2008-2016 
 
Source: The graph is generated based on asylum applications data from the Ministry of Interior in Spain, 
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While the number of international protection applications has been increasing in Spain, the 
Spanish asylum system has been failing to adapt to this substantial variation. The Spanish law 
specifies that the processing period of the asylum applications must take a maximum of six months, 
but the asylum system is unable to conform to the policies and has been witnessing delays in the 
processing of the asylum claims. Figure 2 plots the percentage of the processed applications out of the 
total number of accepted applications for 2008-2016.14 The graph displays a decreasing trend in the 
percentage of processed applications across this period. Specifically, this percentage had decreased 
from 122% in 2008 to 62% in 2016. It is worth noting that in 2015, only 22% of the accepted asylum 
applications were processed, although this year witnessed the highest jump in the number of submitted 
claims (from 5,483 to 14,560), as discussed earlier. A percentage higher than 100% indicates that the 
processed applications in a given year also include some of the pending applications from the previous 
years. The numbers portrayed in Figure 2 suggests that the processing period and thus, the final 
decision on the applications has been taking more than one year, on average.  
Figure 2: The Evolution of the Percentage of Processed Asylum Applications 
over the Period 2008-2016 
 
Source: The graph is generated based on statistics obtained from Eurostat for the period 2008-2016. 
The considerable increase in the number of asylum applications and the delay in their 
processing are the main reasons behind the accumulation of the pending cases and hence, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Yearly statistics on the decisions of the asylum applications in Spain are available at Eurostat. These statistics include the number of total 
decisions, the number of positive decisions, and the negative decisions in each year over the period (2008-2018) (online code: 
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saturation of the Spanish asylum system year after year. In 2015, there were 16,000 pending cases, 
which increased to 20,000 by 2016 and reached 68,779 by the end of 2018 (Eurostat, 2018).  
The limitations of the Spanish asylum system extend beyond its congestion with the asylum 
claims. The rate of rejection on the processed applications has been increasing too. Figure 3 plots the 
total number of processed asylum claims that were rejected and not granted international protection.  
The graph shows how this number changed over the period 2008-2016. It can be seen that there was a 
decreasing trend in the total number of rejected claims until the year 2012. In that year, 270 applicants 
were denied, and this number has been rising since then. In 2015, out of the 3,200 claims processed 
(22% of the accepted applications), 2,220 applicants were not granted international protection. While 
in 2016, 3,395 refugees were rejected and expected to leave Spain. Applicants with a denied 
international protection status will be considered illegal immigrants if they stay in the country.  
Figure 3: The Evolution of the Number of Rejected Asylum Claims over the Period 
2008-2016 
 
Source: The graph is generated based on statistics obtained from Eurostat for the period 2008-2016.  
3.2.    The Relationship between Asylum Seeking and Intermarriage Decisions in Spain 
 The features and the drawbacks of the asylum system in Spain provide the framework that allows us 
to study the impact of legal status acquisition motives on intermarriages. The saturation of the asylum 
system, the delay in the processing of the applications, and the high rate of rejection on the processed 
claims most likely motivate the asylum seekers to search for other faster and more guaranteed 
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applications, the refugees are left on their own for a period that could last for years, where the 
government support is only provided for six months. Regardless of the work permit that might be 
acquired, asylum seekers are recognized as international protection applicants without legal status, so 
they face employment restrictions. This prevents them from finding job opportunities and thus, from 
being self-sufficient. Therefore, their lives and their integration into the society and the economy are 
placed on hold until their applications are processed, and they are granted international protection.  
As a matter of fact, the longer the asylum seekers are waiting for the final decision, the more 
difficult it is for them to start their new lives in Spain successfully in the future. The time that the 
individuals spend unemployed has significant effects on their skills and their productivity. The longer 
the unemployment periods, the lower is the chance of the refugees to find future employment 
opportunities, and the higher are the constraints to their labor market entry (Hainmueller et al., 2016). 
Nonetheless, previous studies have shown that even when international protection is granted, the 
economic assimilation of the protected individuals remains limited. They face relatively worst labor 
market outcomes than comparable immigrants and natives with similar characteristics. They are less 
likely to be employed and more likely to be unemployed. Their wages are also relatively less (Fasani 
et al., 2017).  
Given the limitations of the Spanish asylum system and the deteriorated living conditions of the 
asylum seekers, marriage can be an adequate alternative for legal status acquisition in Spain.  
Marriages in Spain are registered in the Civil Registry if at least one of the partners is a Spanish 
citizen or is not a citizen but a legal resident for at least two years in Spain. When foreign individuals, 
as asylum seekers, intermarry with Spanish nationals or Spanish residents (EU or non-EU nationals), 
they will be recognized as legal residents by the Spanish authority. They will acquire the rights of the 
documented immigrants; hence, the applicants can live, work, and benefit from social services 
(housing, healthcare, and education) and social security in Spain. These privileges will improve their 
living conditions, health, and education. Besides, the Spanish residency introduces asylum applicants 
to more labor market opportunities and grant them access to better quality jobs. Thus, this type of 
intermarriage is a key to successful socioeconomic integration of the asylum seekers.  
Given the status of the asylum system, it is most likely that the desire of asylum seekers to 
acquire legal status in Spain is driving the intermarriages. Since the number of the submitted asylum 
applications reflects the number of seekers with legal status acquisition motives, we expect that there 
is a positive relationship between the number of asylum applications and the registered intermarriages 
in Spain.  
To examine how the number of intermarriages has been changing over the period of our study 
(2008-2016), we use data on all the marriages registered in Spain from the National Statistics Institute 
(Instituto Nacional de Estadistica in Spanish, INE). We exclude from the sample the marriages 
occurring between two EU nationals, to eliminate the marriages that are probably not affected by legal 
status motives of the asylum seekers. Generally, asylum seekers are non-EU nationals, where EU 
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nationals are entitled to live and work in Spain. Therefore, we consider only the intermarriages in 
which at least one of the spouses is not an EU citizen. We generate Figure 4, which portrays the 
change in the level of intermarriages in Spain over the period 2008-2016. It shows that overall this 
number was decreasing until the year 2015, and then it started to increase, reaching 18,000 
intermarriages in 2016.  
Figure 4:  The Evolution of Intermarriages in Spain over the Period 2008-2016 
 
Note: The numbers in the figure excludes all the marriages in which both partners are EU nationals.  
Source: The graph is generated based on the Spanish marriage data from the National Statistics Institute 
(INE) for the period 2008-2016.  
Figure 5 combines the graphs of the evolution of asylum applications (Figure 1) and the 
evolution of intermarriages (Figure 4) over the period 2008-2016. This graph allows us to visualize 
whether there exists a similar trend between the change in intermarriages and asylum applications over 
the years. The figure displays that during the period where the number of asylum applications was 
roughly the same, the number of intermarriages was decreasing. In 2015, as the asylum system 
witnessed the highest jump in the claims (from 5,483 to 14,560), the number of marriages started to 
increase. This illustration suggests that the increase in the number of asylum applications might be 
affecting the number of intermarriages. This relationship would be further analyzed throughout our 
empirical analysis.  
 
In the next section, we describe the data that we use in the empirical analysis. It is also used to 
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Figure 5: The Evolution of Asylum Applications and the Evolution of Marriages in 
Spain over the Period 2008-2016 
 
Note: The graph combines between Figure 1 (The Evolution of Asylum Applications in Spain over the Period 
2008-2016) and Figure 4 (The Evolution of Intermarriages in Spain over the Period 2008-2016).  
Source: Asylum applications data is obtained from the Ministry of Interior and marriage data from the 
National Statistics Institute (INE) for the period 2008-2016.  
4.   Data 
We combine several data sets from different sources to empirically examine the relationship between 
legal status acquisition motives, expressed in terms of the asylum applications, and intermarriages in 
Spain. Our study is performed on the province level, where we consider the 52 Spanish provinces.  
4.1.    Data on Asylum Applications  
We use data on asylum applications, published by the Ministry of Interior in Spain. The Office of 
Asylum and Refugees (OAR) within the Ministry of Interior examines all the submitted asylum 
applications. So, the Ministry has access to all the necessary information on the asylum seekers. It 
provides data on the number of asylum applications submitted, by each country of origin, to the 52 
Spanish provinces. The data is available for each year over the period 2008-2016.  
4.2.    Data on Intermarriages 
We use administrative data on all the registered marriages in Spain over the period 2008-2016, 
obtained from the National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica in Spanish, INE). INE 




























It collects marriage statistics from the Statistical Bulletin of Marriage that the married couples submit 
as they are registering in the Civil Registry in Spain. The INE data provide information on the year, 
province, and municipality of the marriages. Also, it reports information on the spouses’ 
characteristics as their date of birth, country of birth, country of nationality, country of residence, and 
educational level, separately for male and female partners. To serve the aim of our paper and analyze 
whether the incentives of the asylum seekers to acquire the legal status is driving the intermarriages in 
Spain, we restrict the marriage data set. We exclude all the marriages in which both spouses have a 
nationality from an EU country, and not just from Spain. Table 2 shows the total number of EU 
couples married in Spain each year over 2008- 2016. 












Source: The numbers are based on the Spanish marriage data from the INE for the 
period 2008-2016. 
The idea behind this data restriction is related to what we discussed earlier in section 3. To 
obtain the legal status, asylum seekers can marry Spanish citizens and EU nationals or non-EU 
nationals residing in Spain for at least two years.  Generally, asylum seekers are not EU citizens. By 
excluding the marriages of EU couples from the dataset, we know that we eliminated almost all the 
marriages, which are probably not driven by the legal status motives of the asylum seekers. Besides, 
EU nationals have the right to live and work in Spain. We obtain a data set on marriages that include 
all the intermarriages with at least one partner not from an EU country, over the period 2008-2016.  
4.3.    The Sample  
We harmonize the asylum applications data set with the intermarriage data set and merge them to 
obtain a panel of provinces, countries of nationality, and years. Our sample excludes all the countries 
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with information on marriages but not on asylum applications. Those countries are Australia, New 
Zealand, and some other European countries. Thus, it includes the provinces and countries of origin 
with information on both asylum applications and intermarriages over the period 2008-2016. Table 3 
reports the descriptive statistics and show that the sample is of 59,436 observations. Over the period 
2008-2016, the minimum number of submitted asylum applications by a particular country of origin in 
a given year was 0, and the maximum number was 5312. For registered marriages, the highest number 
was 421 marriages, and the lowest number was 0. 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Observations Min Max 
Asylum Applications 59,436 0 5312 
Marriages 59,436 0 421 
5.   Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we empirically examine whether the legal status acquisition motives of the asylum 
seekers affects intermarriage decisions. The number of the submitted asylum applications reflects the 
number of refugees that have the incentives to acquire the legal status. Accordingly, we estimate the 
following baseline specification (1) that captures the impact of the variation in the number of asylum 
applications submitted by the different countries of origin to the 52 Spanish provinces over the period 
2008-2016 on the number of intermarriages registered in each of these provinces: 
Marriagescpt    =  𝛼    +  β  Applications  cp𝑡  +  γc  +  δp  +    𝜇𝑡  +  𝜀cpt                                                      (1)  
where Marriagescpt  represents the number of intermarriages between males and females from the 
country of nationality c, registered in province p, in year t. The explanatory variable Applicationscpt  is 
the number of asylum applications from the country of origin c, submitted to the province p, in year t. 
Our model also includes fixed effects that account for the unobserved heterogeneity present across the 
countries, provinces, and years that might impact the number of intermarriages. Thus, it isolates the 
variation in the number of intermarriages associated only with the variation in the number of asylum 
applications. γc is a set of country of origin fixed effects accounting for the differences in the levels of 
intermarriages within the same year specific to the countries of origin. While, δp is a set of province 
fixed effects, capturing the potential differences in the number of intermarriages across the 52 Spanish 
provinces within the same year, related to unobserved province characteristics. 𝜇t is a set of year fixed 
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effects, controlling for all the possible time trends, common to the provinces and countries of 
nationality, that might affect the intermarriages in Spain, and 𝜀cpt is the error term.  
The dependent variable, which is the number of intermarriages registered in Spanish provinces 
yearly, is a count variable, so we use the Poisson model in all the empirical analysis. Our study is 
performed on the province level. In the regressions, the standard errors are clustered at the province 
level to account for the shocks that might have an impact on the number of intermarriages. The 
coefficient β is our coefficient of interest, which captures the effect of the change in asylum 
applications on the number of intermarriages. A positive and significant estimated β indicates that 
legal status motives positively affect marriage decisions.   
5.1.    Baseline Results  
As described previously, to account for the marriages that are most likely not driven by legal status 
motives of the asylum seekers, the sample excludes all the marriages that occurred between two EU 
nationals over the period 2008-2016. Aylum seekers are generally not EU citizens, where EU citizens 
are entitled to live in Spain. Thus, in our analysis, we consider only the intermarriages in which at 
least one partner is not an EU national. We refer to non-EU nationals as foreigners in this paper.  
We estimate the model specified in equation (1), and the results are reported in Table 4. 
Column (1) shows the estimated impact on the number of intermarriages in general. Column (2) shows 
the estimated effect on the number of intermarriages, in which specifically the male partners are 
foreigners. Whereas, column (3) presents the effect on intermarriages in which specifically the female 
partners are foreigners. The purpose of also estimating the impact separately on intermarriages with 
foreign male partners and on those with foreign female partners is to analyze whether the estimated 
effect differs between these two groups. For instance, Adda et al., (2019) estimate the effect of the 
legal status acquisition of immigrants on intermarriages in Italy (marriages of Italian natives with 
foreigners) and show that foreign females tend to intermarry more than foreign males.  
All the estimates in Table 4 are positive and statistically significant at 1% level. These results 
suggest that as the number of submitted asylum applications to a given province in a given year 
increases, the number of intermarriages registered in this province and year increases too. Column (1) 
shows that 100 additional asylum applications increase the number of intermarriages by 3.6%. Column 
(2) depicts that for every 100 additional asylum applications, the number of intermarriages with 
foreign male partners increases by 3.4%. Column (3) portrays that for every 100 additional asylum 
applications, the number of intermarriages with foreign female partners increases by 3.9%. 
These baseline results suggest that intermarriages are driven by the legal status acquisition 
motives of the asylum seekers. Also, consistent with the previous literature, we find that foreign 
females tend to be more involved in intermarriages than foreign males.  
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Table 4: The impact of Legal Status Acquisition Motives on the Number of Intermarriages 
Variable  Number of intermarriages  
  One partner is not from EU  Male is not from EU Female is not from EU 
  (1)  (2) (3)    
Number of asylum 
applications 
     0.00036*** 
(0.00013) 
      0.00034*** 
(0.00013) 






Province FE YES 
 
YES YES 
Country of origin FE YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES  YES YES 
Note: This table shows the impact of asylum applications on the number of intermarriages, estimated based on the specification in 
equation (1), using the Poisson model. Regressions account for the province, country of origin, and year fixed effects. The standard errors 
are clustered at the province level.  *** significant at 1% level (p<0.01), ** significant at 5% level (p<0.05), * significant at 10% level 
(p<0.1).  
5.1.1.    Additional Baseline Results: Sample Restrictions 
Now, we want to examine the impact of legal status acquisition motives of the asylum seekers on 
intermarriages, while further narrowing our study and considering particular countries of origin.  
First, we focus on the countries with citizens that might be relatively more involved in 
intermarriages in Spain. So we estimate the specification in equation (1) while considering the 
countries that are comparably more present in Spain and thus, have a high concentration of residents. 
We restrict the sample to include only the countries of nationality that have more than 5000 
individuals residing in Spain, in any year over the period 2008-2016.15 We obtain a sample size of 
29,484 observations. The impact is estimated separately for intermarriages with specifically foreign 
male partners and foreign female partners, and the results of the estimations are reported in panel A of 
Table 5.   
For the second analysis, we focus on the countries that have witnessed significant outflow of 
asylum applications to Spain. Probably the asylum seekers from those countries have relatively higher 
incentives to seek alternative ways to acquire their legal status. Thus, they are most likely more 
involved in intermarriages driven by legal status acquisition motives. The reason for this is that those 
applicants have a comparably higher probability of having delayed final decisions on their claims and 
higher chances of not being granted international protection. This results from the congestion in 
applications originating from the countries of those asylum seekers. For this analysis, we estimate the 
specification in equation (1) again, while excluding from the original sample the countries whose more 
than 75% of their total number of submitted asylum applications and intermarriages in Spain over the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Statistics on the Spanish population is obtained from the National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica in Spanish, INE).  
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entire period of analysis (2008-2016) is zero. In this way, we are considering the countries that have a 
high concentration of asylum applications and also are highly involved in intermarriages (see Table 
A.1 of the Appendix). We obtain a sample size of 14,976 observations. The impact is also estimated 
separately for intermarriages with specifically foreign male partners and foreign female partners, and 
the results of these estimations are shown in panel B of Table 5.  
Table 5: The impact of Legal Status Acquisition Motives on the Number of Intermarriages with 
Further Sample Restrictions 
 Variable  Number of intermarriages  
Panel A. Countries of origin with a high concentration of residents in Spain 
 Male is not from EU   Female is not from EU  
 
 (1)  (2) 
  Number of asylum 
applications 
      0.00035*** 
(0.00013) 
      0.00039*** 
(0.00010)  
 Observations 29,484  29,484 
Province FE YES  YES 
Country of Origin FE YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES 
 
Panel B. Countries of origin that have a high concentration of asylum applications and are 
significantly involved in intermarriages in Spain 
 Male is not from EU  Female is not from EU 
 
 (1)  (2) 
  Number of asylum 
applications 
     0.00033*** 
(0.00012) 
      0.00039*** 
(0.00011)  
 Observations 14,976  14,976 
Province FE YES  YES 
Country of Origin FE YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES 
Note: This table shows the impact of asylum applications on the number of intermarriages, estimated based on the 
specification in equation (1), using the Poisson model. In panel A, the sample used in the estimations of columns (1) and (2) 
includes only the countries that have a high concentration of residents in Spain. In panel B, the sample used in the estimations 
of columns (1) and (2) includes the countries that have a high concentration of submitted asylum applications and are 
significantly involved in intermarriages in Spain. The estimations account for the province, country of origin, and year fixed 
effects. The standard errors are clustered at the province level. *** significant at 1% level (p<0.01), ** significant at 5% level 
(p<0.05), * significant at 10% level (p<0.1).  
In each panel, columns (1) and (2) corresponds to the estimated impact on intermarriages in 
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which specifically the male spouses are not EU nationals and on those in which the female spouses are 
not EU nationals, respectively. As it is evident, the estimated coefficients of Table 5 are positive and 
statistically significant at 1% level, indicating that with both sample restrictions, an increase in the 
submitted asylum applications to a particular province in a given year is associated with an increase in 
the registered intermarriages in this province and year. In Panel A, column (1) shows that for every 
100 additional asylum applications, the number of intermarriages with foreign male partners increases 
by 3.5 %. Column (2) indicates that the number of intermarriages with foreign female partners 
increases by 3.9 % for 100 additional asylum applications. Hence, the impact is higher when 
considering intermarriages with specifically foreign females relative to foreign males. In Panel B, 
column (1) reports that 100 additional asylum applications increase the number of intermarriages with 
foreign husbands by 3.3 %. Column (2) portrays that 100 additional asylum applications increase the 
number of intermarriages with foreign wives by 3.9%. Relative to Panel A, the impact is also higher 
when considering foreign female partners.  
It can be noted that these estimates are generally the same across panels A and B. Additionally, 
regardless of which group of countries of origin is considered, we find that the estimated coefficients 
are quite similar in the magnitude and significance relative to the first baseline results reported in 
columns (2) and (3) of Table 4. These findings indicate that the effect of legal status acquisition 
motives of the asylum seekers on the number of intermarriages persist even if we focus on the 
countries that might be relatively more involved in intermarriages and have asylum applicants with 
comparably higher intermarriage incentives. 
5.2.     Robustness Checks  
Now that we estimated the main results, we want to check for their robustness; thus, we run several 
other estimations. 
5.2.1.     Using the Lag of the Explanatory Variable 
First, we want to analyze whether the number of intermarriages is also affected by the lag of the 
number of asylum applications. We rely on our original sample that only excludes the marriages 
occurring between two EU spouses. We re-estimate the specification in equation (1), but we use the 
lag of the number of asylum applications as the explanatory variable. The results of the estimations are 
reported in columns (1) to (3) of Table 6. Column (1) shows the estimated impact on the number of 
intermarriages in general. Column (2) portrays the estimated effect on intermarriages in which 
specifically the husband is a foreigner. The effect on intermarriages in which specifically the wife is a 
foreigner is presented in Column (3).  
As Table 6 shows, the estimated coefficients in the three specifications are statistically 
insignificant, supporting the idea that the impact on the number of intermarriages in a given year is a 
 24 
result of the variation in the number of asylum applications occurring within this same year and not 
the year before. These results suggest that the response of the asylum applicants is fast; they 
immediately seek intermarriage to acquire their legal status. 
Table 6: The Impact of Intermarriages Estimated by the Lag of the Asylum Applications 
Variable  Number of intermarriages  
  
One partner is not from EU  Male is not from EU Female is not from EU 
  (1)  (2) (3)   
Number of asylum 
applications (lagged) 
-0.00019 
  (0.00039) 
 -0.00022 
  (0.00039) 
0.00016 
 (0.00029) 
 Observations 59,435 
 
59,435 59,435 
Province FE YES  YES YES Country of Origin FE YES  YES YES Year FE YES  YES YES 
Note: This table shows the impact of lagged asylum applications on the number of intermarriages, estimated based on the specification in 
equation (1) while using the lag of the number of asylum applications as the explanatory variable. The estimations rely on the Poisson model, 
and account for the province, country of origin, and year fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the province level.  *** significant 
at 1% level (p<0.01), ** significant at 5% level (p<0.05), * significant at 10% level (p<0.1).  
5.2.2.     Excluding Specific Provinces and Countries 
The second set of robustness checks are performed to verify that the baseline results are not affected 
by the fact that for some provinces, the total number of submitted asylum applications in a given year 
over the period 2008-2016 is relatively low. First, we estimate the baseline specification in equation 
(1), while restricting our sample to the provinces, which account for 80% or more of the total number 
of submitted asylum applications in a given year. These are the Spanish provinces that have witnessed 
a total of 100 or more application in a given year over the period 2008-2016 (see Table A.2 in the 
Appendix). We obtain a sample size of 21,717 observations. The impact is estimated separately for 
intermarriages with specifically foreign male spouses and intermarriages with foreign female spouses, 
and Panel A of Table 7 reports the results.   
Column (1) shows that 100 additional asylum applications increase the number of 
intermarriages with foreign husbands by 3.2%.  The coefficient is statistically significant at 5 % level. 
The estimated coefficient in column (2) is significant at 1% level. It shows that for every 100 
additional submitted asylum applications, the number of intermarriages with a foreign wife increases 
by 3.6%. These estimates indicate that foreign females are significantly more involved than foreign 
males in intermarriages. These results are compatible with our baseline results, although the impact on 
intermarriages with foreign males is less significant.  
 25 
Table 7: The Impact on the Number of Intermarriages, Excluding Specific Provinces and Countries 
of Origin 
Variable  Number of intermarriages  
Panel A.  Provinces with a high concentration of asylum applications 
 Male is not from EU   Female is not from EU 
 
 (1)  (2) 
  Number of asylum 
applications 
    0.00032** 
(0.00016) 
       0.00036*** 
(0.00011)  
 Observations 21,717  21,717 
Province FE YES  YES 
Country of Origin FE YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES 
 
Panel B.  Provinces with a high concentration of applications and countries of origin with a high 
concentration of applications and intermarriages 
 Male is not from EU  Female is not from EU  
 
 (1)  (2) 
  Number of asylum 
applications 
   0.00030** 
(0.00015) 
      0.00037*** 
(0.00011)  
 Observations 5,472  5,472 
Province FE YES  YES 
Country of Origin FE YES  YES Year FE YES  YES 
Note: This table shows the impact of asylum applications on the number of intermarriages, estimated based on the specification 
in equation (1), using the Poisson model. In panel A, the sample used in the estimations of columns (1) and (2) includes only the 
Spanish provinces with a high concentration of asylum applications. In panel B, the sample used in the estimations of columns 
(1) and (2) includes the provinces with a high concentration of asylum applications in addition to the countries that have a high 
concentration of asylum applications and are significantly involved in intermarriages in Spain. The regressions account for the 
province, country of origin, and year fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the province level.  *** significant at 1% 
level (p<0.01), ** significant at 5% level (p<0.05), * significant at 10% level (p<0.1).  
Second, we re-estimate the specification in equation (1), but with further restrictions to our 
sample. In addition to focusing on the provinces with a high concentration of asylum applications, we 
exclude the countries of origin whose more than 75% of their total number of submitted asylum 
applications and intermarriages over the entire period of analysis (2008-2016) is zero. This additional 
restriction is similar to the one applied in our baseline estimations, described in Panel B of Table 5 in 
subsection 5.1.1. As previously described, this restriction allows us to focus on the countries with 
asylum applicants that might have relatively higher incentives for intermarriage since it is comparably 
more difficult for them to be granted international protection and thus, legal status. The sample size 
becomes of 5,472 observations. The impact is also estimated separately for intermarriages with foreign 
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male partners and foreign female partners, and Panel B of Table 7 reports the results of the 
estimations. 
Column (1) of Panel B shows that 100 additional asylum applications increase the number of 
intermarriages with foreign male partners, by 3 %. The estimate is statistically significant at 5% level. 
The estimated coefficient in column (2) is statistically significant at 1% level. It indicates that for 
every 100 additional asylum applications, the number of intermarriages with foreign female partners 
increases by 3.7 %. The impact is higher for foreign female partners relative to foreign male partners. 
These results are consistent with our baseline result, though the estimated impact on intermarriages 
with foreign males is relatively less significant. 
Generally, the estimates of Table 7 (Panel A and B) match our baseline results and show that 
our main estimates hold across all the alternative sample restrictions. Hence, it can be noted that the 
presence of some provinces having relatively low submitted asylum applications in a given year over 
the period 2008-2016 is not affecting the main estimated impact on intermarriages.  
5.2.3.    Performing the Analysis on the Country Level 
For our third set of robustness check, we want to analyze whether the legal status motives significantly 
affect the number of intermarriages on the country level and not only on the province level.  So, we 
estimate the following specification:  
Marriagesct    =  𝛼2    +  β2  Applications  c𝑡  +  ωc  +    ρ𝑡  +  𝜀ct                                                      (2)  
where the dependent variable Marriagesct  represents the number of marriages between males and 
females from the country of nationality c, registered in Spain in year t. The explanatory variable 
Applicationsct  is the number of asylum applications from the country of origin c submitted to Spain in 
year t. This specification also includes fixed effects that account for the unobserved heterogeneity 
present across countries and years. ωc is a set of country of origin fixed effects, accounting for the 
differences in the number of intermarriages within the same year specific to the countries of origin; ρ𝑡   
is a set of year fixed effects, controlling for all the time trends, common across all countries, that 
might change the number of marriages in Spain; and 𝜀ct is the error term. The coefficient of interest, 
capturing the impact of legal status motives on the number of intermarriages, is β2.   
We estimate the specification in equation (2) based on three different data specifications using 
the Poisson model. The standard errors are clustered at the country level to account for the shocks that 
might have an impact on the number of intermarriages. The results are reported in columns (1) to (6) 
of Table 8. Columns (1), (2), and (3) estimate the impact on the number of intermarriages, in which 
specifically the male partners are foreigners, using the three different data specifications. Whereas, 
column (4), (5), and (6) estimate the impact on the number of intermarriages, in which the female 
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partners are foreigners, also using the same three data specifications.  
As it is evident, all the reported estimates are positive and statistically significant at 1% level, 
indicating that as the number of asylum applications submitted by a given country of origin to Spain in 
a given year increases, the number of intermarriages in Spain increases in this year. Columns (1) and 
(4) show the results of the estimations using our original sample, that excludes the marriages of EU 
couples. The estimated coefficients reported in these columns are the same for intermarriages with 
foreign male partners and foreign female partners. They indicate that at the country level, 100 
additional asylum applications in a given year increase the number of intermarriages by 1.4 %.  
In columns (2) and (5), the estimations focus only on the countries of origin with a high 
concentration of residents in Spain. So, similarly to our baseline results portrayed in Panel A of Table 
5 in subsection 5.1.1, we estimate equation (2) while restricting the original sample to the countries 
that have more than 5000 individuals residing in Spain, in any given year over the period 2008-2016. 
The results indicate that 100 additional asylum applications increase the number of intermarriages by 
1.4 %. The estimated impact is also the same when considering the intermarriages with foreign male 
or foreign female partners. 
Table 8: The Impact on the Number of Intermarriages, Analysis on the Country Level 
Variable Number of marriages 
 Male is not from EU   Female is not from EU 
  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 














Observations 1,116 549 288 
 
1,116 549 288 
Country of Origin FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Note: This table shows the impact of asylum applications on the number of intermarriages, estimated based on the specification in equation 
(2), using the Poisson model. The estimations account for the country of origin, and year fixed effects. In column (1) and (4), our sample is 
used, without additional restrictions. In columns (2) and (5), the sample used include only the countries of origin with a high concentration 
of residents in Spain. In columns (3) and (6), the sample include the countries that have a high concentration of submitted asylum 
applications and are significantly involved in intermarriages. The standard errors are clustered at the country level.  *** significant at 1% 
level (p<0.01), ** significant at 5% level (p<0.05), * significant at 10% level (p < 0.1).  
Concerning the results of the analysis reported in columns (3) and (6), we estimate equation (2) 
while focusing on the countries of origin that have a high concentration of asylum applications and are 
significantly involved in intermarriages. So, as the analysis reported in Panel B of Table 5 in 
subsection 5.1.1, we exclude from our original sample the countries of origin whose more than 75% of 
their total number of asylum applications and intermarriages is zero. The estimated coefficients are 
also 0.0014 similar to all the previously interpreted estimates of Table 8.  
Based on these results, we find that legal status acquisition motives of the asylum seekers have a 
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significant positive impact on the number of intermarriages on the country level. However, the 
magnitude of the estimated effect is smaller than the one estimated in the analysis at the province 
level. All the estimates in Table 8 have the same magnitude and statistical significance; thus, we do 
not find evidence consistent with the idea that foreign females tend to intermarry more than foreign 
males, at the country level.  
5.3.    Placebo test 
Our baseline results suggest that an increase in the number of asylum applications has a positive and 
significant impact on the number of intermarriage in Spain. Generally, we find that for every 100 
additional asylum applications submitted to a particular province in a given year, the number of 
intermarriages increases by 3.6% in that province and year. We show that the estimated impact is 
higher for intermarriages with specifically foreign female partners (3.9%) relative to those with 
specifically foreign male partners (approximately 3%). 
Table 9: Placebo Test  
Variable Number of intermarriages   
 
One partner is not from EU  Male is not from EU  Female is not from EU 
 (1)  (2)  (3)       







(0.00087)     
Observations 59,436   59,436   59,436 










Year FE YES  YES YES 
Note: This table shows our placebo test, estimated based on the specification in equation (1) with the shuffled asylum applications as the 
explanatory variable. The estimations rely on the Poisson model and account for the province, country of origin, and year fixed effects. The 
standard errors are clustered at the province level.  *** significant at 1% level (p<0.01), ** significant at 5% level (p<0.05), * significant at 
10% level (p < 0.1).  
Now, we want to verify that these main results are not driven by pure chance, so we perform a 
placebo test. To do so, first, we shuffled the number of asylum applications across the countries of 
origin, so that the number of submitted applications by a given country to a particular province in a 
specific year becomes random. Then, we estimate our baseline specification in equation (1) using the 
shuffled asylum applications as the explanatory variable. The results of the estimations are reported in 
Table 9. Column (1) shows the estimated impact on the number of intermarriages in general. The 
estimated effect on the number of intermarriages in which specifically the male partners are foreigners 
is reported in column (2). Column (3) presents the effect on intermarriages, in which the female 
partners are foreigners.   
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Since the numbers of submitted applications are randomly assigned across the countries of 
origin, we do not expect to find an impact on the number of intermarriages. Columns 1,2, and 3 of 
Table 9 show that all the coefficients are statistically insignificant, indicating that our strategy is 
reliable. They signify that the significant positive impact on intermarriages, estimated in our baseline 
results, is due to the increase in the asylum applications and not other random factors.   
6.   Conclusion 
The substantial flow of asylum seekers to Spain in the recent years and the failure of the international 
protection system to conform to this situation raise concerns about the alternative ways that the 
applicants would seek to acquire their legal status. A quick and guaranteed alternative is for the 
asylum seeker to marry a Spanish citizen or a Spanish resident (EU or a non-EU national) who has 
been living in Spain for at least two years. This type of intermarriage will grant the asylum seekers the 
Spanish residency; thus, entitles them to work and live in the country. In light of this situation, we 
analyze how the legal status acquisition motives of the asylum applicants affect the number of 
intermarriages. To do so, we combine data obtained from the Ministry of Interior on the number of 
asylum applications submitted by each country of origin to the 52 Spanish provinces, with 
administrative data on all the marriages registered in Spain from the National Statistics Institute (INE) 
over the period 2008-2016. The sample used in the analysis excludes all the marriages, in which both 
spouses are EU nationals since, in general, these are not driven by the legal status acquisition motives 
of the asylum seekers. 
Our results support our expectations and show that the incentives of the asylum applicants to 
immediately acquire the legal status has a positive and significant impact on their marriage decisions. 
Generally, we estimate that 100 additional asylum applications submitted to a particular province in a 
given year increase the number of intermarriages in that province and year by 3.6 %. We show that 
this estimated impact is higher when considering specifically the intermarriages with foreign female 
partners relative to intermarriages with foreign male partners. For every 100 additional submitted 
asylum applications, the number of intermarriages with foreign female spouses increases by 
approximately 3.9% while the number of intermarriages with foreign males increases by 
approximately 3%. These findings indicate that foreign females tend to be more involved than foreign 
males in intermarriages. We present different sets of robustness checks and show that our baseline 
results are stable and hold across these different sets of estimations. The placebo test suggests that our 
estimated impact on the number of intermarriages is driven by the change in the number of asylum 
applications and not other random factors.  
Nevertheless, one can argue that our analysis is strictly performed over the period 2008-2016. 
If panel data were available, it would be of interest to extend our period of analysis to the most recent 
years. As we discussed before in section 3, Spain witnessed the most significant jump in the total 
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number of asylum applicants in 2015 (from 5,483 to 14,560 applications), and since then this number 
has been rapidly increasing. According to recent statistics issued by Eurostat, the total number of 
applications was reported to be 31,738 applicants in 2017 after it was 16,481 in 2016. In 2018, this 
number increased to 55,750 applications. In parallel, the number of pending applications has been 
increasing too, from 16,000 pending cases in 2015, to 20,000 by 2016, reaching 68,779 by the end of 
2018. Hence, the asylum system is becoming extensively saturated with the applications year after 
year, but our analysis cannot capture the impact of those substantial increases that are occurring 
recently, due to the lack of panel data.  
It is a relevant issue for policymakers to address the consequences that can arise from the 
failure of the asylum system and the subsequent positive impact on the number of intermarriages, 
associated with the legal status motives of the asylum seekers. While the unprocessed applications are 
accumulating in the Spanish asylum system over the years, intermarriage is playing an essential role in 
helping the refugees to transition from the asylum life to a normal life. This type of marriage is 
acknowledged in the literature as a way to improve foreigners’ economic and social status (Wang and 
Wang, 2012). It entitles the refugees to acquire the legal status; accordingly, they will have 
unrestricted access to the labor market and employment services; thus, they can work in high-quality 
jobs. Being self-sufficient elevates their standards of living, health conditions, as well as educational 
level. Consequently, intermarriage can promote the successful integration of the asylum seekers into 
society as well as their contribution to the public finances and the economy.  
Nonetheless, this type of intermarriage is most likely associated with social and psychological 
issues (Srensen and Danneskiold-Samsoe, 2013). It creates distortions in the marriage market since the 
couples are overcoming the cultural differences between them for practical reasons, related to their 
interests. Also, it is likely that refugees live under the despair and mercy of their spouses since they 
cannot risk getting a divorce before three years of marriage and lose their right to reside in Spain. 
Their legal status is directly linked to their marriages. Hence, the spouses can take advantage of this 
situation and use it to pressure and control their foreign partners (Amuedo-Durantes and Arenas-
Arroyo, 2019). Given the vulnerability and the dependency status of the refugee partners, they can be 
subject to different forms of abuses and domestic violence from their spouses, like behavioral or 
action control, emotional abuse (insult, criticism, or degradation), verbal abuse, or physical and sexual 
abuse. 
Policy reforms, imposing regulatory changes that improve the international protection system, 
can amend this situation and limit its negative consequences. The government can adopt action plans 
that improve the management of the system to be able to encompass the significant number of 
applicants arriving at the borders each year. It can implement policies, which control the delays 
occurring in the applications’ processing. Consequently, the urge of the refugees to seek alternative 
ways to acquire their legal status would decrease. The adverse effects that generally rise from 
postponing the decisions on the asylum cases, like the delay in the labor market entry and the 
 31 
socioeconomic integration, would reduce (Hainmueller et al., 2016). Thus, the burden of the 
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Note: This table shows the list of countries that have a high concentration of asylum applicants and of 
citizens involved in intermarriages registered in Spain over the period 2008-2016. We restrict our sample 
to those countries when focusing our analysis on the countries with asylum applicants of relatively high 













































Note: This table shows the list of provinces that have high concentrations of total asylum applications in a 
given year; these are the provinces with a total of 100 and more applications in a given year over the 
period 2008-2016. We restrict our sample to those provinces in one of our robustness checks (subsection 
5.2.2). 
 
